Letters to the Editor: December 2026
The Kids Aren’t Alright
Marcus Peter doesn’t make a single claim with which I disagree in his column “The Failed Experiment in Eternal Adolescence” (Covenant & Civilization, Sept.). Every observation is prescient and accurate. So many of us who are of a certain age look at the kids and realize, “They’re not alright.” This is more than the standard tut-tutting of every aging generation, but an alarmed response to gravely dysfunctional behavior, revealing a frightening emotional fragility.
My only reservation about Dr. Peter’s account is that he neglects a key causal factor: the hyper-sexualization of the past two (maybe three?) generations at an early age. For all his wild theories, I think Sigmund Freud (and, by extension, Erik Erikson) got something exactly right, and I wish we’d pay more attention to it. The “latency phase” of development (roughly ages 7-13) is when a child’s identity is formed, his relation to the world takes shape, and he engages in a host of creative behaviors that help him discover both his sense of self-worth and his vocation. When he is distracted by sexual images and ideas for which he has no mental furniture, they swirl about his mind in an incoherent way and undermine the pivotal work that is supposed to be taking place. Identity and confidence are impacted, maturity is delayed, and fragility sets in.
Whether this sexualization takes place because of abuse, curiosity, or the default culture, the result is the same. Healing is possible, but without identifying the harm (or, worse, mainstreaming the harm as a good) it’s almost impossible to undo the damage. I stopped snickering at the “snowflakes” a long time ago, when I realized that our modern culture, wherein sexual experimentation is encouraged and even expected, is so toxic that we have victimized the young by our negligence. The virtue that is expected of them is well-nigh impossible due to the embedded vices that cripple them from an early age.
There is a mighty “Woe to those” we will face because of this scandal, which has less to do with the failure to “teach that pain can refine, that work can sanctify,” as Peter writes, and more to do with having failed to rein in a bloated entertainment industry that preys on the innocent. Of course the kids are fragile; of course they are lost; of course they are swallowed up in identity disorders. Peter is right that “older Christian societies understood that morality and virtue are bound together,” but “remember that you will die” isn’t the crux. It’s that charity must be grounded in chastity, and when the latent phase is steamrolled by sexual imagery and license, subsequent virtue is flattened in astonishing ways.
Genevieve Kineke
Avon, Connecticut
There’s a supernatural parallel to the natural assessments in Marcus Peter’s column, which explores the perils of avoiding the hardship of becoming a mature adult. What stands out is his point about our indifference to death: “The modern world…hides death behind screens and hospital curtains.” What follows is not surprising: “Once death disappears, [earthly] life loses seriousness.”
The supernatural parallel is the lazy catechesis we’re forced to endure nearly every Sunday and holy day of obligation. Since I returned to the Church after a 30-year absence, I’m still waiting to hear “mortal sin” or even “Hell” mentioned in homilies. Instead, today’s priests talk about “when we get to Heaven” not “if we get to Heaven.” I once had to correct a priest about Luke 16:28. In his homily, he’d said the rich man in Hell had compassion for his brothers because he didn’t want them to end up in Hell with him. After Mass, I told the priest that in Hell there is no compassion, only hatred. The rich man didn’t want any of his brothers to end up in Hell because their arrival would only increase his torment.
A spiritual adolescence is occurring in the Church. The “modern” American Catholic is spiritually weak, chasing the comforts of the world, and has only weak catechesis from “modern” priests to fall back on. Sadly, this laxity will not be corrected anytime soon. We endured the heterodox ambiguity of Pope Francis, and now we are enduring the same with Pope Leo XIV. But this should not surprise us. In 1846 Our Lady of La Salette gave a prophetic warning of deux papes vermoulus, “two worm-ridden popes,” one after another. Another mystic, Marie-Julie Jahenny (1850-1941), spoke of two consecutive popes leading the Church in the wrong direction. In my lifetime I will not see the renaissance of the Catholic Church.
Dan Arthur Pryor
Belvidere, New Jersey
MARCUS PETER REPLIES:
To Genevieve Kineke
Thank you for identifying an important dimension of the crisis that deserves far greater attention. I wholeheartedly agree that the premature sexualization of children has profoundly damaged their emotional development and their capacity for mature relationships. We have allowed an entire generation to be formed within a culture that introduces sexual stimulation long before children possess the intellectual and moral maturity necessary to understand human sexuality within its proper context. Many young people enter adulthood struggling with deeply distorted understandings of intimacy and personal identity.
Your observation about chastity is particularly important. As the Catechism of the Catholic Church teaches, chastity involves “the successful integration of sexuality within the person and thus the inner unity of man in his bodily and spiritual being” (no. 2337). When that integration is disrupted during childhood, the consequences can extend into virtually every dimension of adult life.
I would simply add that this premature sexualization is one destructive manifestation of the larger cultural abandonment of formation that my column seeks to address. A civilization that has forgotten how to cultivate virtue will inevitably struggle to protect childhood innocence because it has already lost its understanding of what human maturity requires.
I also appreciate your insistence that we approach young people with compassion. Many are struggling with wounds inflicted by a culture they did not choose, the destructive influences of which they were never adequately equipped to resist. Their difficulties deserve genuine pastoral care. Yet I caution against continuing to treat the young with kid gloves (pun intended). Love must always be bold and courageous. I have learned from 18 years of international ministry that presenting hard truths clearly is precisely what feeds starving souls. Many get offended, but that should not deter us. I have lost count of how many of those initially offended by the Church’s teachings later wrote to thank me for loving them enough to present the hard truths. Many are now devout Catholics.
I believe our arguments are complementary. Our culture must recover chastity as an essential virtue, and adulthood as a vocation. Both are necessary because authentic Christian maturity requires the integration of our desires within a life ordered toward love and self-giving.
To Dan Arthur Pryor
Thank you for drawing attention to the spiritual dimension of cultural infantilization. I agree that contemporary reluctance to confront death has serious consequences for Christian discipleship, particularly when that reluctance extends into preaching and catechesis.
The Church has always understood that spiritual maturity requires a serious reckoning with our mortality and eternal destiny. Scripture repeatedly calls us to repentance and conversion precisely because our earthly lives have eternal consequences. Christ Himself speaks explicitly about judgment and the possibility of eternal separation from God. Preaching that consistently avoids mentioning sin and judgment risks depriving the faithful of essential truths necessary for their spiritual formation.
I respectfully offer a qualification to your observations.
I encourage caution regarding private revelations and sweeping judgments about the papacy and magisterial authority. The Church distinguishes between public revelation, which constitutes the definitive deposit of faith, and private revelations, which cannot supplement or correct that deposit. As the Catechism explains, even approved private revelations “do not belong to the deposit of faith” (no. 67). Alleged prophecies concerning particular popes should never become the foundation of our understanding of the Church’s present circumstances.
It is also important to resist the temptation to despair about the Church’s future. Every generation has confronted some level of failure in Christian formation, and the history of the Church repeatedly demonstrates that genuine renewal begins through personal holiness and fidelity to Christ. It is, frankly, fatalist to sit on a theological high horse, pointing the condemnatory finger at the hierarchy. Let’s leave judgment of their state to Christ. Our confidence ultimately rests in His promise that the Gates of Hades shall never prevail against His Church (cf. Mt. 16:18). In that light, we will be judged not for the perceived failures of the clergy but for our own very real failures in virtue and the sanctified life.
Your central concern is indeed important. If we neglect to teach the seriousness of sin and the reality of eternal judgment, we risk producing precisely the spiritual immaturity that parallels our broader cultural crisis. Hence, I chide myself and everyone reading this: How boldly and clearly have we expressed the seriousness of sin and the reality of eternal judgment in our own spheres of influence? The doctrinal tools that are the fruit of the Second Vatican Council are the most Scripture-based and widely accessible the Church has ever seen. Hence, I say, thank God we have a Magisterium that has concretely and unshakably taught the seriousness of sin and the reality of eternal judgment. The Catechism alone is evidence of this par excellence.
As a brother in Christ, I also lovingly offer this correction: To accuse popes of heterodoxy without identifying a single teaching of theirs that contradicts the deposit of faith is a serious theological charge made without sufficient evidence. It is an accusation that won’t stand up to scrutiny. Disagreement with a pope’s pastoral approach or rhetorical emphasis does not constitute proof of doctrinal error and, hence, heterodoxy. Catholics have every right to evaluate papal statements critically, though fidelity to the Church requires that such judgments be grounded in actual teachings rather than suspicion or ideological dissatisfaction. No one denies that recent papal history was confusing (the progressive media helped exacerbate that confusion). Nevertheless, authentic Christian maturity also requires theological hope and confidence in God’s providence. These men are validly elected successors of Peter. Accusing them of heterodox ambiguity is a dangerous claim, and I caution against it, lest we call Christ Himself a liar for abandoning His Church to the Gates of Hades.
I hope my response is received in the brotherly love with which it is presented. Thank you again for reminding us that the recovery of genuine adulthood must include the recovery of spiritual responsibility and an honest reckoning with eternity.
Awakened to Grace
“Waking Wilfred Parker” by my longtime friend and colleague in the apostolate of apologetics, Patrick Madrid, was one of his finest literary efforts (Oct.). It put me in mind of two episodes from my salad days as a seminarian (I was 22 at the time).
The diocese had just established the Church of St. Martha in Point Pleasant, New Jersey, in the summer of 1993. The founding pastor had taught me in high school and asked if I would like to assist him. Inasmuch as I had already been assigned to the diocesan school office for the summer, I indicated I would only be available for the weekends, which is what he really needed, anyway.
The following summer, he got his bid in for me early enough that I could be with him full time. One of my responsibilities was visiting the local hospital, a floor each morning (Ocean County is still more than 70 percent Catholic). I would bring Holy Communion to the patients and then assemble a list of those who needed a priest for confession or anointing.
One of the patients, Harold, was semi-comatose and generally nonverbal. However, as I approached him, he would shout, “Our Father! Our Father, who art in Heaven!” The nurse said, “He recognizes your Roman collar.” As soon as I placed the Sacred Host on his tongue, he would cry out, “Jesus! Jesus!” And then he would return to his previous state.
That same summer, I attended to a lovely elderly woman, Claudia, who was dying of cancer. One morning, the rectory phone rang at 7:30. It was the hospital, indicating that Claudia was in her last hours. The pastor discharged me, as he had to celebrate the 8:00 AM Mass, and said he would go afterward to give her the apostolic pardon. When I arrived, Claudia was surrounded by family members praying the Rosary, and she was joining in, albeit haltingly. I gently chided her son for not calling us sooner, to which he replied, “Mom told us not to. She said, ‘Let the Fathers get their sleep; they’ve been so good to me. They can come later.’” As I presented her with the Sacred Host, she smiled softly, opened her mouth, swallowed — and died. Her son said, “That’s what she was waiting for all night.”
Thank you, Patrick, for your story, which roused those two memories from my youth. How sad and angry, however, your story and mine make me when I consider the aggressive push to dispose of folks like those from our recounting, under the guise of dignity and compassion, when the real motivation is unalloyed utilitarianism.
Rev. Peter M.J. Stravinskas
Editor, The Catholic Response
Pine Beach, New Jersey
So Many Misapprehensions
I was puzzled by Thomas Storck’s review of my book Mysticism, Magic, and Monasteries: Recovering the Sacred Mystery at the Heart of Reality (Oct.). Storck is someone I hold in high regard, and I’m indebted to him for his work on economics and Catholic social doctrine. I was, therefore, surprised by his review, containing as it did so many misapprehensions of my arguments. Allow me, then, to clarify several points whereon he attributes to me views I do not hold.
First, Storck misunderstands my argument about monasticism. I do not argue that the Church should not change to meet the challenges particular to each period of her history, nor do I argue that she should not have developed as she did, giving rise to the friars in the 13th century and the clerical institutes in the 16th. My argument is, rather, that such developments, however necessary they may have been, have explanatory power for how an ecclesiastical culture centered on personal consecration and the sanctification of place was gradually displaced by a culture characterized more by clericalism and abstractionism.
Second, Storck misunderstands my case for Neoplatonic metaphysics. I do not argue that such philosophy should be accepted in an unbaptized form, or that the views of all its Christian interpreters should be accepted uncritically. Rather, I argue that certain elements of Neoplatonic metaphysics should be recovered as indigenous to the Church’s realist philosophical tradition, particularly as that tradition was developed by St. Thomas Aquinas. Insofar as I make a case for Neoplatonic metaphysics in Mysticism, Magic, and Monasteries, I do so in continuity with my earlier work, The World as God’s Icon: Creator and Creation in the Platonic Thought of Thomas Aquinas (2020).
Storck writes that “Christian thinkers who interested themselves in some of the more dubious aspects of Neoplatonism, such as Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and John Scotus Eriugena, have always stood under a kind of theological cloud.” Yet among those who “interested themselves” in Neoplatonism was Aquinas. This raises a question Storck does not address: Is the Angelic Doctor under this “theological cloud”? If not, why not? I also note that Dionysius the Areopagite, arguably the most Neoplatonic of the Church Fathers and the authority Aquinas quoted more frequently than any other, is conspicuous by his absence from Storck’s list of so-called clouded thinkers.
Third, Storck misunderstands my argument about emanation, a term he highlights that I use seven times in the book. That is, however, one fewer than the number of times Aquinas uses the term to describe his own account of the Creator-creation relation in his Summa Theologiae (I, 45, 1, co.). More importantly, Storck does not engage with the account of emanation I actually offer.
Indeed, I anticipated the objection that metaphysical emanation necessarily compromises God’s freedom. I explain that God’s dual exemplarism — His divine ideas and His existence — is indirectly participated in by the essences and acts of existence, respectively, of created beings, whose being is freely willed by Him at every moment of their existence. This is the Thomistic account of emanation, which I adopt as my own, and which Storck ignores, instead implying that my views are somehow pantheistic.
Fourth, Storck misunderstands my argument concerning egregores. I grant that the concept is unusual, rooted in the noncanonical First Book of Enoch and subsequently developed by various Western esoteric thinkers. But I analyze the concept explicitly from an orthodox Catholic perspective, considering it in light of the Church’s received epistemology and the theology surrounding blessings and curses.
My argument is not, then, that egregore constitutes an established category of Catholic theology. Rather, it is that the phenomenon to which the term refers can be examined using categories that are familiar within Catholic thought. Human beings can possess and share ideas that take hold of communities. When such ideas are false, they can be manipulated by evil spirits and can operate like curses on the corporate minds of those communities, leading to harmful collective behaviors. A Catholic analysis of this phenomenon, pressing in our own time for obvious reasons, can make helpful use of the term egregore. This term may not be commonly used in Catholic discourse, but my scrutiny and use of it in no way conflicts with Catholic teaching.
Finally, Storck misunderstands my use of the term Church and criticizes me for using it in a way that includes “the separated Byzantines and the Anglicans and other Protestants.” But Church can be used in diverse ways, and surely Storck knows that the most basic concept of Church encompasses all the baptized. Were this not so, the Church’s government could not have legitimately coerced baptized dissenters away from their disobedience and toward canonical regularity.
The above are not peripheral matters. They concern central arguments of my book, and in each case, the position Storck attributes to me differs from the position I defend. On almost every point on which he addresses my book, Storck misunderstands its content, despite the fact that my arguments are clearly spelled out in the text. Storck’s review thus falls short of his intellectual abilities as demonstrated in his commendable writings elsewhere.
Sebastian Morello
Wolfgang Smith Chair in Philosophy, St Mary’s University, London
London, United Kingdom
THOMAS STORCK REPLIES:
Sebastian Morello claims that I have misunderstood key points in his book. I think a careful examination will show that I have not.
On the question of the priority of monasticism against the rise of the later orders and congregations, Morello wrote in his book that “many of the Church’s modern maladies are due to the…transition over the centuries from a monastic culture to a clerical culture”; that by prioritizing these new institutes, the Church “largely helped to unravel its mission centuries later”; and it took centuries to secularize Europe, because Satan had to contend “against the very essence of the Old Continent itself, an essence begotten by the mystic veil of monastic life that was draped over it for millennia. On the other hand, it takes a Pentecostal preacher one day in a South American town to have the whole of its population abandon their Catholic faith…because South America was evangelized by friars and clerics.” I think it’s clear that Morello’s attitude toward the new forms of religious life is more negative than he admits here in his letter. But this is a minor matter compared to the others.
Morello says I misunderstand his case for Neoplatonic metaphysics. But I said little about Neoplatonic metaphysics as such. What I objected to is his call to make use of the Corpus Hermeticum, with its notions of what C.S. Lewis called “a deliberate syncretism based on the conviction that all the sages of antiquity shared a common wisdom and that this wisdom can be reconciled with Christianity.” Certainly, pre-Christian and non-Christian thinkers have enunciated many truths. But I question the idea that a body of esoteric pagan thought, such as the Hermetic writings, can do much, if anything, to address the deep problems currently facing the Church (and modernity as a whole). As to Neoplatonism broadly conceived, it was the common philosophical background of the Patristic era. Obviously, it was taken for granted by many Church Fathers. My objection was not to making use of Neoplatonic authors — which, admittedly, Aquinas himself does — but to the specific question of the Hermetic writings. This Morello does not address.
I pointed out that when Morello speaks of God’s creative act, he calls it an “emanation,” a term which, given its condemnation by the First Vatican Council, seems to have a dubious status. Morello notes that Aquinas uses the term to describe God’s creative actions. Indeed, Aquinas uses it in an article of the Summa dedicated to proving that God created everything out of nothing. So, obviously, the term is not incompatible with orthodoxy. But the question is: Why, especially in view of the conciliar anathema, would someone use it today to say creation is making something out of nothing? I specifically allowed that emanate might have an acceptable meaning in Morello’s book, as it undoubtedly does in St. Thomas’s Summa, but Morello creates a contrast between that term and an understanding of creation as “a mere artifact of Divine will,” as something that led to Deism. Such a contrast is wholly unnecessary, as if we were forced to choose between some notion of divine emanation and a willful and inscrutable deity à la Ockham or the detached god of Deism.
Regarding egregores, Morello now argues that they are nothing more than collective delusions or false notions that “take hold of communities” and “can be manipulated by evil spirits and can operate like curses on the corporate minds of those communities, leading to harmful collective behaviors.” I have no problem with that, but that is not what he wrote in his book. Rather, there he put forth the following:
The term “egregore” belongs to Hermetic philosophy and to Western esotericism more broadly. The notion of “egregore” is not dissimilar to that of “tulpa” in Tibetan Buddhism, the latter being a spiritual agent generated by the intense concentration of an elite monastic practitioner. “Egregore” is different, however, because according to the simplest definition, it is a spiritual force that arises out of the collective commitment of a people to a falsehood…. The exact metaphysical structure of egregores continues to be disputed. It remains obscure how human thought can merely by thoughts and words, generate a spiritual being…. The reason for this ambiguity is partly because egregores only make sense when considered within a category of knowledge and practice too readily dismissed today, namely magic.
So, egregores are not simply an explanation of mass human delusions; they are some sort of being, and we can understand them only if we resort to the practice of magic. Moreover, it seems clear that Morello is not using magic in some metaphorical sense, for he writes, “The art of magic precisely holds that special words and incantations, with gestures and the use of distinct artefacts, accompanied by extreme mental concentration, can together possess a causal power beyond what belongs to common communication.” I am not surprised that Morello does not try to defend this thesis in his letter.
Morello says I misunderstand his use of the term Church, the “most basic concept” of which “encompasses all the baptized.” But is this so? To take just one example, Mysterium Ecclesiae, a 1973 declaration of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, plainly teaches, “The followers of Christ are…not permitted to imagine that Christ’s Church is nothing more than a collection (divided, but still possessing a certain unity) of Churches and ecclesial communities.”
Christ’s one Church, the Catholic Church, is sorely in need of healing. The question is: Where are we to seek healing? The central and authentic tradition of the Church and Catholic thought offers more than sufficient material, which, coupled with divine grace, is surely all we need. The practice of magic and rummaging around in the European esoteric tradition ought instinctively to be seen as off-limits to a Christian.
Forms of Witness
Congratulations to Ronald J. Rychlak for his well-written guest column on Bl. Fulton J. Sheen and Ven. Pope Pius XII (“The Blessed Archbishop & the Venerable Pope,” Oct.). He rightly presents the two men as allies in the same struggle, and they were allies in fact as well as in spirit. It was Pius XII who made Sheen a bishop in 1951.
Their roles could hardly have been more different. Sheen was the public voice. From an American pulpit, a radio microphone, and later a television studio, he could name Hitler and Stalin and mock them freely. Pius had no such freedom. A career diplomat and former nuncio to Germany, he led the Church from a Rome governed by Mussolini and later occupied by German troops. He knew what public protest could cost. When the Dutch bishops denounced the deportations of Jews in 1942, the Nazis answered by deporting Jewish converts to Catholicism, among them Edith Stein. So, Pius worked behind the scenes. When the Germans rounded up Rome’s Jews in 1943, thousands found refuge in the city’s convents, monasteries, and Vatican properties.
Yet both men rested their opposition on the same foundation. Sheen warned that men had traded reason for “state reason,” “class reason,” and “race reason.” Pius’s teaching rested on the same truth: Human dignity comes from God, not from the state, a class, or a race. Both saw totalitarianism as a denial of who man is.
As the Church celebrates Sheen’s beatification, Prof. Rychlak’s column reminds us that witness takes more than one form. Sometimes it is the bold voice; sometimes it is the quiet work done out of sight.
Vincent B. “Chip” LoCoco
New Orleans, Louisiana
Ronald J. Rychlak’s guest column does double duty. It skewers the caricature of Pope Pius XII as a myopic anti-communist, blind to all ideological evils that did not derive from the work of Karl Marx. More, it underscores the importance of drilling down into the controversies and rhetoric of the day to recognize underlying spiritual dangers. No doubt, both Pius and Fulton Sheen would applaud today’s American Catholic bishops who challenge the not-so-crypto-paganism manifest among our most powerful leaders — leaders who prize power over morality, spectacle over discernment, and cruelty over compassion.
Kevin Doyle
South Nyark, New York
I commend the NOR for publishing Ronald J. Rychlak’s guest column, for it highlights the special qualities Fulton Sheen and Pius XII had and the mutual admiration they shared. Though both are rarely mentioned together, their lives are inseparable, for they both upheld the same eternal truths and fought the same insidious evils during the same tumultuous era.
As Dr. Rychlak ably shows, both Sheen and Pius recognized the dangers of totalitarianism early on and had the ability to see that the horrors of communism, fascism, Nazism, and anti-Semitism were not separate and distinct but part of the same global movement — a movement that wanted to dethrone God and replace Him with a pagan, ruthless, and never-ending tyranny, a movement that had to be unwaveringly opposed all at once.
Having helped protect much of humanity from these deadly ideologies, both men also provided shining Christian guidance to a weary and fractured postwar world. Much of that guidance is expressed in the (often maligned and misrepresented) documents of Vatican II, which cite Pius XII’s teachings more than those of any other pontiff. Archbishop Sheen, too, was directly involved in the council, having attended all four sessions, richly contributing to Ad Gentes, the “Decree on the Church’s Missionary Activity.”
The world and the Church are again buffeted by waves of violence, relativism, and confusion, and if we want to restore stability and orthodoxy, we can do no better than to study and learn from these two heroic Catholic witnesses, whom Pope Leo XIV has already praised in his young and inspiring pontificate.
William Doino Jr.
Redding, Connecticut
Riddled with Nonsense
I enjoy reading the NOR because its editor is focused on helping readers get at the truth, while also entertaining us with interesting perspectives and histories — and big words. But even the best of editors can get sloppy and include a feature he should not. Jason M. Morgan’s column “‘We Have Forgotten God’: A Conversation with Waleed Siam” (Cultural Counterpoint, Oct.) is just such a feature. Why should it not have been included?
Morgan’s column is factually incorrect. It ignores how the war in Gaza started. Siam says Hamas attacked Israel. Has Hamas not been the elected government of the Gazans for the past 19 years, and are not its members Gazans? Does Israel not have the duty to destroy an army that killed, raped, and took its citizens captives?
Morgan calls the war a “genocide.” Does he justify that claim? No. He just asserts it. He does not even define the group that is being systematically destroyed. It can’t be the Gazans; they hardly qualify as a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. Further, they are being fed and given medical care by the Israelis. And though their numbers have been reduced by the fighting, 95 percent of them are still there.
Morgan states that Israel was built on land taken from native peoples. Proof? None provided. Anybody familiar with history understands that Israeli immigrants paid for much of the land, and that many of the native peoples fled in 1948 when they felt the Arab armies would destroy Israel — that is, they abandoned their ownership. The Arabs that did not are citizens of Israel. And, of course, Israel forced all Israelis to leave Gaza in an offer to the Palestinians for peace. That didn’t happen.
Morgan’s column is also riddled with nonsense. Morgan says that “the Zionists wiped out Judaism in the region.” Is the region the Middle East? Guess what? Judaism is still there.
John L. Dyer
Vienna, Virginia
I have enjoyed my subscription to the NOR, even when I disagree with a feature. After reading Jason M. Morgan’s interview with Waleed Siam, I will not be resubscribing. The interview is dishonest garbage, even anti-Semitic propaganda, though it desperately tries not to seem to be. And from an NOR contributing editor? Sad and disgusting.
Rob Beshaw
Menands, New York
THE EDITOR REPLIES:
To John L. Dyer
Jason M. Morgan does indeed state how the war began. He says, “Hamas breached…‘perhaps the most sophisticated’ border in the world and attacked communities inside Israel on October 7, 2023.” Nothing incorrect about that. Hamas is not an ethnic party of Gazans but a radical Islamic militant movement that began as a spinoff of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas ascended to political power via national parliamentary elections in 2006, and it seized control of Gaza in 2007 after an armed conflict with its rival, the Fatah party. Since then, there were no elections in Gaza until earlier this year, and Hamas did not take part in the 2026 election. (Needless to say, voter turnout wasn’t great due to the ongoing violence in the strip.) Presently, the Israeli Defense Force controls some 70 percent of Gaza. “Ordinary Palestinians,” Siam says, “are caught between Israel and Hamas.”
Hamas insurgents killed approximately 1,200 Israelis on October 7, and abducted about 240. In the ensuing Israeli military action, according to the United Nations’ Gaza Strip Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (Apr. 20, 2026), more than 71,000 Palestinians have been killed, and over 171,000 injured. “Many are missing under the rubble,” the report states (corroborating Siam’s assertion), making a full accounting of the casualties difficult, if not impossible. The most common estimate is that 72 percent of the casualties are civilians (leaked Israeli intelligence data from 2025 indicate that civilians account for 83 percent of the death toll). If you believe in Catholic just-war theory, then Israel has violated two of its principles: proportionality and noncombatant immunity. Regarding the latter, Morgan and Siam’s entire conversation details Israel’s deliberate and systematic extermination and displacement of Palestinians in Gaza — the very definition of genocide.
Of course, the history of the conflict predates October 2023. For a fuller assessment, readers may refer to Thomas Storck’s guest column “Clarifying Our Thinking about the Holy Land” (Oct. 2024).
Mr. Dyer claims that 95 percent of Gazans “are still there.” Talk about a simple assertion! Where did he get that figure, and why did he not justify that claim? How are the Palestinians in Gaza faring? According to the UN report, “Over 1.9 million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip have been internally displaced to locations inside of the Gaza Strip, many of them multiple times over; and over 1.2 million people — almost 60 percent of Gaza Strip’s population — have lost their homes.” The ones who are still there are suffering greatly. That’s why “ordinary Palestinians,” Siam says, “are the real victims” of the Israel-Hamas war.
The “region” in question is Syria, Iraq, and environs. Judaism, Dyer claims, “is still there.” According to the Jewish Virtual Library, the once thriving, historic Jewish community in Syria has dwindled to six individuals. Six! Ditto in Iraq, where one of the world’s oldest and most historically significant Jewish communities now numbers five individuals. Still there? Barely, and Judaism will be gone with the desert wind before long.
Suffice it to say that Dyer’s claim that Morgan’s interview with Siam is “factually incorrect” is itself incorrect.
To Rob Beshaw
Anti-Semitic? Hardly. Anti-Zionist? Absolutely. Siam goes to great lengths to underscore the distinction, which seems to have been lost on Mr. Beshaw. “Zionism is not Judaism,” Siam explains. “Zionism is a political ideology; Judaism is a religion…. Criticism of the Israeli government must never be confused with hatred of Jews.” It’s difficult to see desperation in those statements.
Readers are, of course, free to disagree, but imputing dishonesty without due justification of that claim is itself a dishonest tactic, and it undermines debate by casting doubt on truth itself. But then, truth is, as the saying goes, the first casualty of war.
To NOR readers
Jason M. Morgan has made the difficult decision to discontinue his Cultural Counterpoint column. The one in question here was his last. We thank him for his many years of writing and — yes — provoking, and we wish him well in his future endeavors.
The Baggage They Carry
I couldn’t agree more with Lewis M. Andrews’s assessment of the present situation of U.S. public schools and the lamentable and extensive damage done by teachers’ unions and LGBT indoctrination, which has caused incalculable confusion among countless innocent child-victims (“School Choice Wouldn’t Just Reform Education. It Would Reform Society.” Sept.). Dr. Andrews identifies the school-choice initiatives presently offered in various communities, which he sees as promising radical improvements in the education of our nation’s children.
I am skeptical due to the inherent student-teacher-administration dynamics in classrooms and schools and, especially, the interactions among students in hallways and lunchrooms and on playgrounds. Does Andrews think it is merely a matter of plucking children from low-performing inner-city public schools and plunking them down in affluent suburban equivalents, and “all will be well”? Do not children from impoverished (in many ways) educational environments carry certain types of “baggage,” and might they, therefore, have a negative impact in their new classrooms and schools? Might not children blessed by stable, two-parent families be negatively impacted by interacting with children from backgrounds that sadly and seriously lack basic, loving guidance and formation — oftentimes due to extreme neglect or the sheer absence of parental presence?
Wouldn’t shifting large numbers of students from low-performing public schools into Catholic equivalents be the equivalent of “watering down the soup”? One diocesan high school, located in a demographically non-Catholic area, was shut down when the non-Catholic student population rose to two-thirds of the total (thus aiding none of the students). Administrators realized that the school’s “Catholic mission” could no longer be fulfilled and pulled the plug.
I remember hearing religious sisters lament parents’ attitudes toward diocesan schools (at which said sisters taught). In what might be called their “dry cleaner” expectations, parents figured they could drop off their children by 8:00 AM and pick them up after 3:00 PM, sparkling clean and totally spotless. The sisters said they could do little for the children if their parents didn’t provide compatible and coherent moral and spiritual training of their kids at home. Even the minimal spiritual commitment of taking their kids to Sunday Mass was not a prevalent practice, and such a grave omission completely undermined any spiritual formation the schools sought to provide. Add in children from households where their progenitors practice serial polygamy or are not sacramentally (or even civilly) married, and it’s “game over” for a diocesan school’s efforts at the spiritual formation of its students.
Fr. Joseph Klee
St. Philip the Apostle Church
Columbus, Ohio
LEWIS M. ANDREWS REPLIES:
I thank Fr. Joseph Klee for his thought-provoking letter, but I think his concern about giving public school kids the right to go to a Catholic school is not valid.
First, the only thing school-choice programs do is provide subsidies to families whose children have been accepted at a nonpublic school. It does not guarantee admission to any school. Admissions at every private or parochial school are up to that school; the subsidy only makes it easier on the family financially to send their child to a nonpublic school where their child has already been admitted.
Second, there are many more private and parochial schools than you might imagine — especially since COVID-19, when many families started their own small schools (technically called “microschools”), a phenomenon that has since spread throughout the country. Just because a child from a public school has been denied acceptance to a Catholic school does not mean that child is stuck; there are schools of other denominations (Baptist, Lutheran, etc.), nondenominational private schools, and these new microschools. Homeschooling, collaborative homeschooling, and private tutoring are also options in some school-choice programs.
Third — and I’m sure Fr. Klee knows this — many kids who struggle in public schools blossom rapidly in an alternative schooling venue, especially if they are young. But whether a private or parochial school wants to take that risk is completely up to the school. School-choice programs do not give more freedom to families by taking freedom away from educators.
Sin & Separation from the Self
Andrew M. Seddon’s review of The Curse He Chose: In Aeternum, Book 1 by Allison Regina Gliot, F.S.P., and other vampire novels (Oct.) was just right for the season — in more ways than one. It fit not only the Halloween spirit but the real, sacred spirit of All Saints’ Day and All Souls’ Day.
Dr. Seddon reminds us that many vampire tales are not just moral — good vs. evil — but deeply spiritual. The best are replete with symbols of holy things and struggles of the soul, which is why they are still popular. I know that plenty of authors lack the depth and sense of responsibility to make their work worth reading, but the genre has been steadily emerging from a phase of cheap and sordid shadows into something of real quality. This is Catholic territory now — not that the best vampire stories of the past were not also Catholic-inspired — and in some of the newer books the battle between good and evil is beyond powerful. It’s us battling our own sinful nature, just as a vampire might struggle against his curse. And the idea (I can’t say the image without making a pun) of the separation from self that results from sin, even to the point of having no reflection in the mirror — now that’s vivid!
I’ll be hunting for Sr. Allison’s book to add to my own somewhat eclectic library. Speaking of books to add, I’d like to share another contemporary vampire novel Seddon doesn’t mention: The Buffalo Hunter Hunter by Native American writer Stephen Graham Jones. Though it isn’t explicitly Catholic, it has a Catholic flavor, and I found it well worth reading.
Colleen Drippé
St. Marys, Kansas
ANDREW M. SEDDON REPLIES:
I appreciate Colleen Drippé’s comments, coming, as they do, from an accomplished author who has written several excellent Catholic-infused science-fiction novels and many short stories, (including those of a supernatural nature (though none that I am aware of concerning vampires). She rightly points out that the best novels contain a spiritual dimension, wherein we can see ourselves — our struggles, failures, sins, spiritual flaws, and the consequences thereof — and that, no matter how far we might fall, redemption and salvation are still possible, a hope that lies at the heart of our Christian faith.
There are undoubtedly other novels I have not mentioned, as my remit was for a review, which expanded into a brief but limited overview. I encourage readers to search out other offerings from Catholic authors, and I recommend the Catholic Writers Guild as a place to learn about authors professing the Catholic faith who aim to expand the boundaries of genre fiction to include a Catholic worldview.
Reversing the Relevant Terms
In response to John McFadden (letters, Sept.), Robert Kurland rightly says that no experiment has refuted an article of the faith. That point needs no quantum mechanics, only the observation that materialism is a philosophical commitment rather than a scientific finding. Dr. Kurland’s article “Quantum Mechanics, Transubstantiation & Why Aristotle Was Right After All” (June) goes further, however, and its central parallel asks one word to do two different jobs. In Aristotle, substance names what a thing is; in quantum mechanics, a state specifies the probabilities associated with possible measurements. Calling the latter a “substantial state” does not make it substantial in Aristotle’s sense. That identification is a philosophical thesis, not a result of the formalism.
This matters because the proposed analogy reverses the relevant terms. A quantum measurement may change the state used to represent an electron, while the electron remains an electron. In transubstantiation, by contrast, the substance of bread does not remain, while its sensible accidents do. Quantum mechanics contains no observable called Aristotelian substance, nor does an apparatus measure substance qua substance. A transition between quantum states, therefore, cannot, without further argument, be identified with substantial change in the Aristotelian sense.
The difficulty becomes decisive in Kurland’s claim in his article that “a quantum system can undergo a real change in its substantial state while measurements yield the same statistical distributions of properties.” Which measurements? If he means some specified measurements, the claim is true but irrelevant to the Eucharist. Two quantum states may agree in their statistics for one observable while differing for another; a change in relative phase, for example, can be invisible in one measurement basis and detectable in another. The dispositions have changed. But the consecrated host retains the sensible accidents of bread. If, instead, Kurland means that every possible measurement yields the same statistics, then standard quantum mechanics does not represent two distinct states at all: states that agree on the probabilities of all possible measurements are operationally the same state. Quantum mechanics, therefore, cannot supply the purported analog — a real difference of quantum state wholly invisible to every possible measurement.
This limitation is no defect in quantum mechanics. St. Thomas Aquinas calls the conversion entirely supernatural, effected by divine power alone (cf. Summa Theologiae III, q. 75, a. 4). A natural science should not be expected to contain a formal representation of transubstantiation. Indeed, to demand one would be to misconstrue both the science and the sacrament.
The same caution is needed when Kurland speaks of the host’s retaining “quantum states of constituent particles.” Contemporary physics can certainly represent the measurable structure associated with the species; a chemist examining the species would still obtain the characteristic results associated with bread. But physics does not by itself decide the metaphysical status of whatever its particle or field variables represent under the eucharistic species. Aquinas holds that the substance of bread is absent while its accidents remain by divine power, with dimensive quantity bearing the other accidents (cf. Summa Theologiae III, q. 77, aa. 1-2). To infer from preserved measurable structure to persisting substantial subjects is, therefore, to introduce an additional philosophy of nature. That premise must be argued; it cannot be read off the quantum formalism.
A related problem appears in the treatment of superposition and potency. Superposition has genuine experimental consequences: coherent states yield interference effects that incoherent mixtures do not. But a state’s expansion into basis components depends on the chosen basis. An electron described as spin-up along the z-axis is a superposition of x-spin eigenstates without anything in the electron changing merely because the same state is written in a different basis. Experiment establishes the physical significance of coherence; it does not establish that the mathematical components of a chosen expansion are independently existing things. A baseball’s position or velocity resolved into three vector components is not three positions or velocities “in” the ball. The classical analogy does not reproduce quantum interference; it illustrates the narrower logical point that mathematical decomposition alone does not determine ontology.
Nor does the word potency close the gap. Aristotelian potency is a real capacity grounded in the nature of the subject. A quantum state is a mathematical state representation from which probability assignments are derived. One may argue that the latter represents real potencies, but the identification requires a metaphysical bridge argument. Werner Heisenberg’s use of Aristotelian language is historically interesting; it is not a derivation from quantum mechanics. The formalism can constrain an interpretation, but it does not select Aristotelian metaphysics on its own.
The measurement problem makes the point especially clear. Kurland maintains that an Aristotelian account avoids appeals to consciousness or an arbitrary classical-quantum cut, yet he also acknowledges in the ensuing correspondence that how and where actualization occurs remains open. That is a fair admission, but it limits the claim. Aristotelian language may offer a promising metaphysical description of actuality and potency, but an account that leaves the locus and mechanism of actualization unresolved has redescribed the measurement problem rather than solved it.
The broader methodological danger is important. Whenever a scientific theory is recruited to support a metaphysical or theological conclusion exceeding the theory’s empirical content, the decisive work is being done by philosophical bridge premises. Those premises may be sound, but they must be identified and defended as philosophy rather than permitted to borrow the authority of the science. This is not an argument for keeping philosophy out of physics. On the contrary, physicists cannot avoid philosophical interpretation. The question is whether the philosophy has been made explicit and whether the inference follows.
I share Kurland’s central conviction that hylomorphism is an asset, and I agree that quantum mechanics does not vindicate materialism. But Aristotle does not need quantum mechanics to be right, and transubstantiation does not need a quantum analog to be coherent. Aristotelian categories are prior to the physical theory in the relevant logical sense — they are among the conceptual resources by which we ask what the theory is about and what sort of reality its mathematics represents.
Kurland closes his response to McFadden by invoking Adoro Te Devote: the senses report the accidents, while faith reaches what they cannot. The quantum formalism likewise reports measurable structure. Mathematics has no privileged instrument for detecting Aristotelian substance.
Alexander R. Sich
Senior Lecturer in Physics, Kennesaw State University
Kennesaw, Georgia
ROBERT KURLAND REPLIES:
Alexander R. Sich’s letter is the most searching critique my article has received, and I am grateful for it — not least because it displays a command of both the physics and the Thomism that makes disagreement profitable. It is worth noting first on how much we agree: that hylomorphism is an asset, that quantum mechanics does not vindicate materialism, that physicists cannot avoid philosophical interpretation, and that the eucharistic conversion is wholly supernatural, effected by divine power alone (cf. Summa Theologiae III, q. 75, a. 4), so that no natural science should be expected to contain a formal representation of it. On that last point I said as much in the article: the Eucharist is a miracle, not a quantum effect, and I claimed no quantum analog for it. Our disagreement is narrower than the length of his letter might suggest. Let me take his principal points in turn.
First, the charge that my phrase “substantial state” asks one word to do two jobs. Prof. Sich is right that the quantum formalism contains no observable called substance, and that no apparatus measures substance as such. If “substantial state” suggested an identification of the quantum state with Aristotelian substance, the fault lies in my wording, and I accept the correction. What I meant, and should have said more carefully, is an analogy of structure: in both cases, a thing’s being is not exhausted by the catalogue of its measurable properties. That is a philosophical thesis, not a theorem of the formalism — but it was offered as one. Sich’s dilemma about my sentence on “the same statistical distributions” is likewise fair: quantum mechanics cannot represent a difference of state invisible to every possible measurement. Exactly so — and that is no embarrassment to the doctrine, for it is precisely why no chemist examining the consecrated species will ever detect the change, and why what happens at the altar is known by faith and not by assay. The sentence overreached; the point it served does not depend on it.
Second, the demand that the bridge premises be identified and defended as philosophy rather than borrowing the authority of the science. Agreed, entirely — indeed this was the article’s central contention, stated from the other direction: no interpretation of quantum mechanics is empirically provable, since every consistent interpretation saves the phenomena by construction. The choice among them is made on philosophical grounds — coherence, economy, intelligibility — and my claim was never that the formalism selects Aristotle, but that quantum phenomena are more intelligible under Aristotelian categories than under the actualist metaphysics its rival interpretations tacitly assume. Readers who want the bridge premises argued at full technical rigor should go to those better equipped than I to answer Sich in kind: Robert Koons’s papers on hylomorphism and quantum theory, and the work of Ruth Kastner, Stuart Kauffman, and Michael Epperson on quantum states as res potentia. The arguments he asks for exist; they are simply longer than a magazine article.
Third, Sich’s observation that an account leaving the locus and mechanism of actualization unresolved has “redescribed the measurement problem rather than solved it.” Two replies. Every interpretation currently on offer either redescribes the problem or purchases a solution at extravagant metaphysical cost — an infinity of unobservable worlds or a superdeterminism that undermines the experimental method itself. On the open question, the Aristotelian reading is no worse off than its rivals; on the paradoxes it dissolves, it is better off. And in Imre Lakatos’s terms, an interpretation is a research program: open problems are the normal condition of a progressive one. How the passage from potency to act is to be represented mathematically is a matter for ongoing research; it is not a precondition of the interpretation’s utility — any more than the absence of a rigorous measurement theory in 1926 was a precondition of using the Born rule.
Fourth, a historical remark bearing on Sich’s distinction between “the formalism” and “interpretation,” which is cleaner in logic than it ever was in history. As I learned in first-year quantum mechanics in graduate school at Harvard — from Julian Schwinger, if memory serves, and at my age that qualification is load-bearing — the projection operators representing measurement were not an original feature of the theory; John von Neumann supplied that postulate in 1932. The Born probability rule itself was an addendum — the famous |ψ|² appearing, of all places, in a footnote added in proof to Max Born’s 1926 paper. The formalism never wore its ontology on its sleeve. Interpretation was bolted on from the beginning, which is why it cannot be avoided now — a point on which, once again, Sich and I agree.
Sich closes by observing that mathematics has no privileged instrument for detecting Aristotelian substance, and that Aristotle does not need quantum mechanics to be right. Just so, on both counts. But the generations catechized to believe that quantum mechanics retired Aristotle — and with him the intelligibility of the Church’s eucharistic doctrine — needed to hear that it did no such thing. That, and only that, was the article’s apologetic burden. I thank Prof. Sich for making me carry it more carefully.
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